Takshashila Issue Brief - One Year of Russia-Ukraine War
Authors
Introduction Today, the 24th of February, marks the first anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. What began as a ‘special military operation’ by Russia has turned into a full-fledged war. Thousands of lives have been lost, property and infrastructure worth billions destroyed and Europe faces a severe refugee crisis with many people fleeing the war.
Led by President Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukrainians have put forth a surprisingly stiff resistance to the Russian might. Meanwhile, Russia has doubled down on its military actions. Multiple threats of using nuclear weapons issued by Russia also run the risk of escalating the regional conflict to a global level.
The West, led by the U.S., is actively involved in the situation through its aid and support to Ukraine and the imposition of economic sanctions on Russia. U.S. President Joe Biden even made a surprise visit to Kiev last week. China on the other hand has been openly sympathetic to the Russian cause while calling for a diplomatic settlement of the issue.
India has walked a diplomatic tightrope by refraining from condemning Russian actions but calling for an end of hostilities and resolution of the conflict through dialogue. India has so far abstained from U.N. and UNSC resolutions against Russia. India’s realist foreign policy has sought to maximise its interests and consequently, India has been importing more Russian oil than ever before.
Along with the Covid-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine war is a seminal event shaping future geopolitics and is likely to determine the shape and trends of the post-pandemic world order. One year has elapsed from the beginning of the Russian invasion and the end of the war remains nowhere in sight.
In this Issue Brief we take a look at the views put forth by us at Takshashila regarding the Russia-Ukraine war and allied concerns.
Pre-Invasion In Takshashila Intel Estimate: Russia - Ukraine Tensions Assessing Risks for India, given the long-standing Russian anxieties over the eastward expansion of NATO and military build-up on its borders with Ukraine towards the end of 2021, we analysed different scenarios.
Likely scenarios included the continuation of the status quo with minor variations, short surgical operations or military skirmishes orchestrated by Russia, and a full-scale Russian invasion. The final scenario turned into reality in just a couple of months thereafter much to our and the world’s surprise. The scenario presented multiple risks to India which continue to play out today.
If the U.S. were caught up in the protracted conflict on European soil, China would see a window of opportunity to assert itself and raise the levels of aggression in the Indo-Pacific region generally and the Taiwan Strait particularly. The controversy over Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022 gave China an excuse to up the ante over Taiwan and adopt a more aggressive posture.
The biggest challenge for India remained the need to continue transacting with Russia over imports in critical sectors like defence, space and energy, without being seen to condone its actions. This was attenuated by the contradiction that India is seeking closer cooperation with the U.S. over the years, which is a strategic and economic imperative.
The Invasion The initial Indian response to the invasion was restrained, and it hasn’t changed much since then. While this has opened India to charges of double standards by the West, the fact that the war does not directly impact India’s strategic interests and the long-standing association with Russia has meant that India’s approach has domestic support.
China, on the other hand, has continued its support and backing for Russia’s actions and interests in the region. Western sanctions against Russia have led to an increase in bilateral trade and economic cooperation between China and Russia. China has also seen this as an opportunity to warn the West against security coalitions in the Indo-Pacific. However, the united front presented by the West and its allies in support of Ukraine and the isolation of Russia might give China indications of things to come, concerning the Taiwan issue.
The fallout from the war, however, has been severe. Ukraine is facing a humanitarian disaster. The West’s response in the form of economic sanctions, including private companies pulling out of Russia, has set back the cause of globalisation and international free trade by decades. Many developing countries, including India, have suffered due to global supply chain disruptions, and global inflation in commodity prices caused by the war and its effects. And finally, it has given rise to the ugly and dangerous spectre of nuclear war.
Nuclear War Russian President Vladimir Putin has on more than one occasion threatened the use of nuclear weapons in the war against Ukraine, despite the latter not possessing any nuclear weapons. Such threats pose the risk of elevating the conflict to a global level and assured widespread destruction. It gives cause for countries like India to speak up, given the escalation possibilities.
Since India’s nuanced foreign policy allows diplomatic channels with both sides and its commitment to a nuclear no-first-use (NFU) policy, we have argued that India should issue a call for an NFU pledge by Russia and the U.S. in the context of the ongoing war. It can take a step further by introducing a resolution in the UNSC calling for the parties involved in the Russia-Ukraine war to formally commit to an NFU pledge.
India’s Position & Interests India’s stated foreign policy goal is to pursue strategic autonomy, and in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, this translates into the challenge of maintaining its relationship with Russia without upsetting the West. However, the war presents India an opportunity to rebalance military imports from Russia and also re-evaluate its foreign policy by considering what truly goes into enjoying strategic autonomy.
An oft-cited reason behind India’s fear of antagonising Russia is its dependence on Russia for military supplies. On closer scrutiny, we have argued that this is not as big an impediment as it is believed to be. First, due to economic sanctions and the war situation Russia’s ability to deliver on defence orders is already impacted and is unlikely to change in the near term.
Second, India can look to substitute defence imports from Russia wherever supplies can be sourced from other countries or domestic markets. Lastly, going forward, India must be willing to “bear the price of strategic autonomy” by ensuring our defence supplies are diversified and come from countries with whom we share a deep trade relationship.
Strategic autonomy is a function of national power and India needs to grow its economy to boost its national power. This requires alignment with countries with whom India enjoys convergence of economic and strategic interests and shared values, which happens to be the West at this point.
Siding with Russia for the “sake of proving [India’s] independent credentials is the precise opposite of strategic autonomy”. If military import dependence on Russia is restricting India’s independent foreign policy choices, then it reveals an absence of strategic autonomy. In any case, due to the war, Russia is far closer to and reliant on India’s primary strategic adversary China today. Therefore, India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy must mean that its geopolitical choices and foreign policy follow its security and geoeconomic interests.
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